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Abstract 
The impact of EU agricultural support policies on farms’ economic performance is an 
interesting issue for policy makers. The objective of this paper is to investigate technical 
efficiency and technical efficiency change of specialized German, Dutch and Swedish 
dairy farms and to compare their relative productivity. Three subsidy-related variables 
are introduced to reflect the wealth and insurance effect and the coupling effect of 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies. Our results imply that a higher degree of 
coupling in farm support negatively affects farm efficiency, and the motivation of 
farmers to work efficiently is lower when they depend to a higher degree on subsidies as 
a source of income. Our study indicates that the composition of subsidies has a much 
smaller effect on efficiency than does the composition of total farm income. Relative 
productivity scores show that German and Swedish dairy farms have potential for 
improvement in productivity, compared to the production technology in the 
etherlands. In conclusion, it is questionable whether farm income support of CAP 
since the 1992 CAP reform is suitable to achieve its goal to increase farmers’ overall 
competitiveness by improving their efficiency. 
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Introduction 
The agricultural income support policy within the European Union (EU) Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) is complex and involves many policy instruments. In the last 
two decades, the CAP has gone through three major reforms. In 1992, the MacSharry 
reform introduced a movement from price support to direct farm payments based on the 
area farmed and livestock kept, and it also reduced the intervention prices (Folmer et al., 
1995, Ingersent et al., 1998). The second reform, Agenda 2000, expanded the shifts 
towards direct payments. Intervention prices were further reduced, and these cuts were 
compensated by the introduction of yearly direct payments (Benjamin et al., 1999, EU-
Commission, 1999). The 2003 Fischler reform further weakened the link between 
subsidies and production by introducing the Single Payment Scheme, which was to 
decouple the direct payments from production (Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006). In 
short, the various CAP reforms have undergone a long process from price support, to 
the production-related direct subsidies, and eventually to decoupled payments. 
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The impact of agricultural support policies on farms’ economic performance is an 
interesting question for policy makers. Economic performance can be studied by 
efficiency measures such as technical efficiency (TE) and productivity (Coelli et al., 
2005). Subsidies can increase TE if they provide an incentive to innovate or switch to 
new technologies (Harris and Trainor, 2005), or decrease TE if higher income from 
subsidies weakens the motivation in the form of slack or lack of effort (Bergström, 
2000). Therefore, how much and in what direction the CAP subsidies affect farm-
performance is an empirical question. Several authors studied the effects of participation 
in EU subsidized credit programs and found a negative effect for German (Brümmer 
and Loy, 2000) and Greek (Rezitis et al., 2003) farms. Others examined the impacts of 
CAP direct payments (DP). Iraizoz et al. (2005) found that DPs affected TE negatively 
for Spanish beef farms, while Hadley (2006) showed that DPs increased TE for dairy 
and beef producers in England and Wales. The study of Hadley (2006), however, found 
the opposite impact in other farming sectors. Kleinhanß et al. (2007) reported the 
distorting effects of direct payments on efficiency. Recently, Zhu and Oude Lansink 
(2010) found a negative impact of the total CAP subsidies in the crop farms in 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
Actual effects of subsidies on a producer’s performance are complex and have led to 
a large number of studies
3
. First, impact of decoupled income support on a farm’s 
production decisions can be attributed to a wealth effect and an insurance effect. If 
farmers are risk averse, any measures that reduce risk or increase income will have 
effects on production (Lopez, 2001). Hennessy (1998) showed that agricultural income 
support policies directly affect the decisions of producers, that are characterized by 
decreasing absolute risk aversion, in the presence of uncertainty. In that study, 
decoupled programs were found to increase expected profit (i.e. wealth effect). Due to 
the presence of risk and uncertainty in agricultural production, the income-stabilizing 
effect of income support policy against risk may also affect optimal decisions (i.e. 
insurance effect). Furthermore, when the income support is explicitly coupled to 
production, there is a third mechanism (i.e. coupling effect). 
Second, subsidies can also indirectly affect production decision through the impact 
of additional income on off-farm and on-farm labor supply (Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1981). That is, income from subsidies changes the time allocated to farming. Findeis 
(2002) showed that income transfers reduced total working time, due to an increase in 
affordability of home time. Woldehanna et al. (2000) found that decreased price support 
in combination with direct income support most likely increased off-farm employment 
of arable farm households in the Netherlands. El-Osta et al. (2004) found a positive 
effect of decoupled payments on on-farm labor supply, and thus on production decision. 
Serra et al. (2005a) showed that the decoupling associated with the 1996 US agricultural 
policy reform reduced the likelihood of off-farm labor participation. Similarly, Ahearn 
et al. (2006) found that government payments, whether coupled or decoupled, had a 
negative effect on off-farm labor participation. Ooms (2007), however, did not find an 
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links subsidies to market imperfections and input-output allocation (Moschini and Sckokai, 1994; Oude 
Lansink and Peerlings, 1996; Bezlepkina et al., 2005; Serra et al., 2005b; Serra et al., 2006). 
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effect of decoupled payments on the on- and off-farm labor supplies and production. 
Furthermore, subsidies can affect the firms’ long-term performance through an effect on 
financial variables such as debt, solvability and liquidity. Those financial factors 
influence investment decisions, thereby affecting farms’ production potential in the long 
run (Hubbard, 1998, Ooms, 2007, Young and Westcott, 2000). These changes in 
production decision eventually influence their technical efficiency. 
Although previous studies have investigated the direct and indirect effects of 
subsidies, an empirical analysis of the impact of the coupling, and the wealth and 
insurance components of (CAP) subsidies on efficiency is missing. This paper 
contributes to the literature by fulfilling the objectives (i) to investigate technical 
efficiency and technical efficiency change (TEC) of specialized German, Dutch and 
Swedish dairy farms, (ii) to identify the coupling, and the wealth and insurance effect of 
subsidies and (iii) to determine the relative productivity of dairy farms across countries, 
which shows the direction of improvement in productivity towards the best production 
technology. The paper employs a stochastic output distance function and an inefficiency 
effects model (Battese and Coelli, 1995) to analyze the determinants of efficiency 
within each country in 1995-2004. We argue that the coupling effect (i.e. impact of 
coupled subsidies) can be derived from subsidies related to inputs and outputs. The 
wealth and insurance effect of the CAP payments is derived from a variable 
representing the share of total subsidies in total income. We compare the performance 
of the dairy farms in the sample across countries by analyzing their relative 
productivity. Following the methodology employed by Oude Lansink et al. (2001), we 
calculate the ratios of predicted output from the ‘own country’ production technology to 
the predicted output from the production technologies of ‘other countries’. The ratios 
indicate the potential for improving performance relative to the best available 
technology across countries. Empirical insights into relative productivity differences 
between countries might shed some light on the impact of subsidies on the 
competitiveness because of the potential impacts of subsidies on technical efficiency 
because of the potential impacts of subsidies on technical efficiency. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
background on the impacts of subsidies and other variables on efficiency and elaborates 
the output distance function and inefficiency effects model. This is followed by the 
specification of the empirical model in section 3 and the description of the data in 
section 4. In section 5, we present and discuss the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Impact of Subsidies and Other Variables on Inefficiency 
Inefficiency models usually include exogenous factors that are related to 
managerial, environmental, and socio-economic characteristics. The CAP subsidies in 
the period 1995-2004 is a kind of direct income transfer which is based on historical 
production. Therefore, there is little possibility for farmers to adjust their production 
decision solely based on the amount of subsidies they received. As such we treat 
subsidies as an exogenous variable in the analysis. This study has a specific interest in 
the impact of subsidies on technical efficiency. According to the European 
Community’s Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) database, total subsidies 
consists of six categories: (i) total subsidies on crops including compensatory/area 
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payments, set aside premiums and other crop subsidies, (ii) subsidies on livestock 
including subsidies on dairying, other cattle, sheep and goats, and other livestock, (iii) 
other subsidies including environmental subsidies, less favored area subsidies and other 
rural development payments, (iv) subsidies on intermediate consumption, (v) subsidies 
on external factors including wages, rent and interests, and (vi) decoupled payments. 
Since the Single Payment System, which decoupled DPs from production, is used after 
2005 (Swinbank and Daugbjerg, 2006), the last category are not reported for the period 
1995-2004 used in this study. More details on the volume of subsidies are given in 
Table 1A of Appendix 1. 
The objective of this paper is, among others, to determine the wealth, insurance and 
coupling effects of subsidies on technical efficiency. However, truly decoupled 
subsidies (i.e. single farm payments) reflecting the wealth and insurance effect have not 
been granted in the studied period. We introduce three variables (see Table 1) to reflect 
the coupling, and the wealth and insurance effect of subsidies. The first and the second 
subsidy-related variables (i.e. share of livestock subsidies and input-related subsidies in 
total subsidies) reflect the coupling effect of CAP subsidies. The two variables account 
for headage livestock payments and arable area payments, which are based on the fixed 
number of livestock head and fixed area and yields, respectively. It is a generally 
accepted view, that the area aids and headage payments are largely coupled to 
production (Beard and Swinbank, 2001). Input-related subsidies have an indirect effect 
on output through their impact on input use, implying that their degree of coupling will 
be lower than that of output related subsidies. Note that subsidies on crops are included 
in the input-related payments, as in the case of specialized dairy farms the production of 
crops can be treated as input (e.g. feed) for dairying. The third subsidy variable included 
in the inefficiency model is the share of total subsidies in total farm income. Total 
subsidies from CAP are considered as a source of non-stochastic income and thus they 
may influence farmer production decision through the wealth and insurance effect. 
Furthermore, as the effect of the coupled income support is already controlled by the 
shares of output-related and input-related payments, the share of total subsidies in total 
farm income also captures the wealth and insurance effect of other subsidies. Those 
other subsidies include environmental subsidies, less favored area subsidies, and other 
rural development payments, which are assumed to be decoupled from production. 
 
Table 1 Explanatory variables (z) in the inefficiency effects model and their definitions 
Variable name Definition 
Livestock subsidies Share of livestock subsidies in total subsidies (%) 
Input-related subsidies Share of the sum of subsidies on crops, intermediate consumption 
and external factors in total subsidies (%) 
Total subsidies Share of total subsidies in total farm income (%) 
Farm size Farm size in terms of European size units (ESU) 
Degree of specialization  Share of milk production in total production (%) 
Family labor  Share of family labor in total labor (%) 
Rented land Share of rented land in total utilized land (%) 
Long-term debt Share of long and intermediate run loans in total assets (%) 
Short-term debt Share of short run loans to total assets (%) 
Time trend Time=1 for 1995, time=10 for 2004 
Regional dummies 12 dummies for Germany and 2 dummies for Sweden 
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In the initial analysis, we included the actual levels of subsidies rather than their 
shares. However, the actual levels of subsidies were correlated with the size variables. 
Therefore, we propose to use shares rather than actual levels of subsidies in this 
analysis. However, this solution comes at the cost of a number of homogeneity 
assumptions, i.e. 
- Homogeneity of degree zero of the coupled subsidies components on efficiency. 
This assumption implies that a 1% increase in all subsidy components does not 
affect the efficiency through what we call the coupled subsidies effect. In other 
words, in our approach the coupling effects reach the farmers only through the 
relative composition. 
- Homogeneity of degree zero in total revenues and subsidies. This assumption 
implies money illusion of farmers in total revenues and subsidies, i.e. a 1% 
increase in all revenues (through yield and/or price increases) and subsidies does 
not induce farmers to become more or less efficient. This means that the actual 
size of subsidies does not provide incentives to farmers but its share in total 
income does. 
Other explanatory variables in the inefficiency model are farm size, specialization, 
labor use, land use, financial management, and geographical regions
4
. The variable of 
farm size captures the impact of economies of scale, which has been shown to impact 
TE both negatively (e.g. Ahmad and Bravo-Ureta, 1996) and positively (e.g. Bravo-
Ureta and Rieger, 1991). According to Alvarez and Arias (2003) though, increasing 
farm size with constant managerial ability can lead to diseconomies of size. The degree 
of specialization accounts for any advantages related to more knowledge in a single 
production activity, which could positively affect farm performance (Latruffe et al., 
2005). However, a higher degree of specialization may eventually reduce the efficiency 
of production in case economies of scope are present or due to the fact that more 
diversified farms are more flexible to adapt to changing market and policy environments 
(Hadley, 2006). Family labor tests whether it increases (e.g. Hallam and Machado, 
1996) or decreases (e.g. Tzouvelekas et al., 2001) farm performance. The share of 
rented land in total utilized land is used to measure the impact of ownership. Reliance 
on rented land can improve performance due to the increased financial pressure. 
However, in case of misaligned incentives between contracting parties, a higher share of 
rented land can lead to lower TE (Giannakas et al., 2001, Karagiannis et al., 2003).  
The shares of long- and short-term debts in total assets account for the impact of 
financial risk and pressure on farmers. Farms that have relatively high debt ratios may 
not be able to keep up with technical/technological changes and new legislative 
environment (Paul et al., 2000). However, debts may have a positive effect on farm 
performance if they provide an incentive to farmers to produce efficiently (Zhengfei and 
Oude Lansink, 2006), and if they result in more efficient capital investments (Barnes, 
2008).  
Differences in TE may be attributed partly to differences in environmental 
conditions (e.g. climate, soil) to the extent to which these conditions are the same in one 
specific region. These differences are accounted for by including regional dummies in 
the inefficiency effects model. The FADN database provides us with 13 regions for 
                                                 
4 Factors such as milking system and feeding system may also explain differences in efficiency across 
farms. However this information is not available so we will not consider these variables in the paper. 
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Germany, 1 region for the Netherlands and 3 regions for Sweden. Note that the regional 
dummies do not account for all differences in environmental conditions between farms. 
The part which is not explained by dummies is reflected by the error term. In addition, 
the parameter estimates of the explanatory variables in Table 1 may be slightly biased 
(e.g. Kumbhakar et al., 2008). 
 
Output Distance Function and Inefficiency Effects Model 
Assume that the production technology is defined by an output set Y(x), representing 
the vector of outputs My R+∈  that can be produced by an input vector 
x R+∈ . That is 
( ) { : can produce }MY x y R x y+= ∈ . The output distance function
5
 is defined as 
( , ) min{ : / ( )}OD x y y Y xθ θ= ∈ . DO(x, y), and is non-decreasing, positively linearly 
homogenous and convex in y, and decreasing in x (see Färe and Primont, 1995). The 
value of the distance function is less than or equal to one for all feasible output vectors. 
On the outer boundary of the production possibilities set, the value of DO(x, y) is one. 
Thus, the output distance function indicates the potential radial expansion of production 
to the frontier.  
The output distance function is by definition linearly homogenous in outputs, which 
is imposed by dividing all outputs (vector y) by one of the outputs ( my ). Homogeneity 
in outputs implies that tmi
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and Perelman, 1999, Fuentes et al., 2001):   
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where β is a vector of parameter to be estimated, itu  is a non-negative random error 
term representing the time-varying technical inefficiency and independently distributed 
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 σδ
+ . The output-oriented technical efficiency for firm i at time t is defined as 
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itit yxDuTE =−= .       (2) 
Different factors can explain the TE differences amongst firms. These factors are 
exogenous variables, which are neither inputs to the production process nor outputs of 
the firm, but which nonetheless exert an influence on producer’s performance. Our 
approach assumes that the exogenous factors influence the degree of TE and hence 
these factors are modeled directly in the inefficiency term. The basic model is based on 
Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Battese and Coelli (1995). It is assumed that the suit '  are 
non-negative random variables reflecting firm-specific and time-specific deviations 
from the frontier, associated with TE of production. In equation (1), itu  is specified as  
                                                 
5 An output distance function instead of input distance function in the empirical analysis is used because 
the possibility for leasing and purchasing milk quota in the countries allows for expansion or contraction 
of milk output. Furthermore, we argue that there are more severe limitations in the markets of inputs like 
land, labor and capital. Not surprisingly an abundance of empirical micro economic studies considers 
these inputs as short-run fixed. 
6 Endogeneity of a normalized output distance function is a theoretical concern in the literature. As 
Brümmer et al. (2002) argued, the normalized output distance function does not suffer the problem of 
endogeneity. Besides, a large body of the literature employed this approach for the empirical studies. 
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ititit wzu += δ ,         (3) 
where itz  is a vector of firm-specific time-varying J variables (called explanatory 
variables or exogenous factors) exogenous to the production process, and δ  is an 
unknown vector of J parameters to be estimated. The error term itw ~ (0, 
2
wσ ) is 
truncated from below by the variable truncation point δitz− . The frontier model (1) 
with inefficiency effects model (3) allows for a simultaneous estimation of the impact of 
different factors that determine TE. Therefore, technical efficiency corresponding to the 
production frontier and inefficiency effects is defined as 
}exp{)exp( itititit wzuTE −−=−= δ .       (4) 
Technical efficiency change rate is defined as: 
t
u
TEC t
∂
∂
−= . Taking the derivative of 
the definition of technical efficiency (i.e. }exp{ itit uTE −= ) with respect to t, it is not 
difficult to obtain a general form of TEC: 
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Empirical Model  
Technical Efficiency and Technical Efficiency Change  
This study employs a Translog specification of the output distance function. The 
Translog provides an attractive framework for estimating stochastic frontier models, 
allowing for a more flexible functional form representation of the technology than the 
Cobb-Douglas (Greene, 1980). 
For the vector of outputs My R+∈ , each output is indexed by m or n, m or n=1, 2, …, 
M. For the vector of inputs Nx R +∈ , each input is indexed by j or k, j or k=1, 2, …, .  
The vector of exogenous variables is JRz∈ and each variable is indexed by p, p=1, 2, 
…, J. After multiplying by -1 in both sides of (1), we obtain the following specification 
for the i-th firm at time t: 
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where uit is defined by: 
itpit
J
p
pititit wzwzu ++=+= ∑
=1
0 δδδ .      (7) 
The distributions of the error terms in (6) and (7) have the assumptions: 
),0(~ 2vit iidv σ , ),(~
2
uitit zu σδ
+  and )  (0,~ 2wσwit . Using ititit uv −=ε  in (6), 
technical efficiency is estimated as 
])[exp( ititit uETE ε−= .       (8) 
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The marginal effect of each exogenous variable ( pz ) on technical efficiency can be 
calculated from:  
pititpititpitit
TEzuEzTE δε Ψ=∂−∂=∂∂ /])[exp( ,    (9) 
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For an empirical study, we use a discrete time (t=1, 2… T). With t-1 as the base 
year, the rate of technical efficiency change (5) can be written as: 
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WC . Clearly, technical inefficiency or technical efficiency is 
explained by a set of specified exogenous variables (vector z) and the error term w 
captures the influences of the other unspecified factors in the stochastic frontier model. 
Therefore, technical efficiency change can be decomposed into the contributions of 
explanatory variables (ZC1,…, ZCJ) and unspecified factors (WC) (Zhu and Oude 
Lansink, 2010). 
 
Relative Productivity 
The output distance function (6) and inefficiency effects model (7) are estimated for 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, respectively. For comparing the differences in 
performance across the three countries, one possibility is to use a pooled model on TE 
as discussed by Brümmer et al. (2002). However, in this paper we propose to use a 
relative productivity measurement because assuming a common frontier for three 
countries is not appropriate considering the different production technologies. The 
relative productivity measure is conceptually similar to the inter-firm catch-up approach 
presented by Oude Lansink et al. (2001). It measures the relative performance of a 
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country within the industry as the ratio of output evaluated at country’s own production 
technology to the output evaluated at the production technology of the ‘best performing 
country’. Relative productivity indicates not only the differences in technologies across 
countries (i.e. potential for technical change) that stem from the different adoption rates 
of innovations across countries in a specific sector, but also the potential differences in 
input quality across countries (e.g. managerial capability, education, experience). 
Furthermore, relative productivity differences can be due to differences in composition 
of vintages of capital (Oude Lansink et al., 2000). 
The estimates of the output distance function can be used to make a comparison of 
the relative productivity of dairy farms in these countries. The output distance function 
(6) can be written as 
      oitititit Dyyxfy ln),,(ln 11 += β , (13)   
or, 
      ),,()ln( 1
1 βititit
o
it yyxf
D
y
= . (14)   
Note that smaller values of Do indicate closer proximities to the frontier and a higher 
value of ( )oit Dy1ln . The deterministic part of the output distance function, i.e. 
),,( 1 βititit yyxf , provides a measure of the production potential in each country. In the 
analysis of the relative productivity, the output for each country (e.g. 1ln y  ) can be 
predicted using its own technology and the technologies of other countries. If the output 
under its own technology is higher than the outputs from technologies in other 
countries, this specific country is more productive than its counterparts. 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data for specialized dairy farms over the period 1995-2004 are obtained from the 
FADN under the principal type of farming: specialist dairying PTF41. The FADN 
database contains mainly input expenditures and output revenues. The available FADN 
data did not allow us to distinguish conventional from organic farms, so both farm types 
are represented. It should be noted though that conventional and organic dairy farms 
may have different production frontiers (see e.g. Gardebroek et al. 2010), and this is not 
accounted for in our study. Price indexes of agricultural products with year 2000 as the 
base year are obtained from EUROSTAT and are used to calculate Tornqvist price 
indexes for the aggregate inputs and outputs. Next, we compute implicit input and 
output quantities as the ratios of values to the price indexes. 
According to the FADN database, farm total output consists of three categories: 
crops and crop products, livestock and livestock products and other outputs. Since we 
focus on dairy farms, we separate milk from the livestock and livestock products. Table 
2A of Appendix 1 shows the composition of outputs for specialized dairy farms. It 
shows that the dairy output (milk & products) amounts to at least 65% of the total 
outputs. Therefore, we aggregate the remaining part (crops & crop products, other 
livestock products and other output) as ‘other products’, and finally distinguish two 
outputs (milk and other products) for the total outputs. Regarding the inputs, we 
distinguish one variable input, which includes crop-specific costs such as fertilizers,  
livestock-specific inputs such as feed, veterinary fees and milk tests etc., and three 
factor inputs (capital, labor and land). In FADN, livestock heads are included in the 
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category of capital. This classification is in line with other applications in the literature 
(e.g. Brümmer et al., 2002). Descriptive statistics of variables in the output distance 
function are shown in Table 2, whereas more detailed yearly summary statistics of the 
model variables are available upon request. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of model variables in output distance function 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Germanya 
 Milk (€) 90,888 58,662 13,252 413,046 
 Other products (€) 32,810 19,991 4,347 136,177 
 Variable inputs (€) 73,470 43,791 6,868 438,746 
 Capital stock (100 €) 2,825 4,385 337 458,499 
 Labor (hrs) 4,036 1,950 2,186 31,910 
 Land (ha) 58 37 8 364 
 
Netherlandsb 
 Milk (€) 159,668 87,422 11,563 525,867 
 Other products (€) 42,355 39,276 3,776 311,657 
 Variable inputs (€)  102,330 52,922 16,698 467,700 
 Capital stock (100 €) 4,168 2,441 425 31,308 
 Labor (hrs) 4,362 1,656 756 13,149 
 Land (ha) 42 23 6 214 
 
Swedenc 
 Milk (€) 97,128 106,332 184 1407,383 
 Other products (€) 36,363 45,217 150 501,265 
 Variable inputs (€)  91,446 95,277 3,876 1431,048 
 Capital stock (100 €) 3,238 2,916 176 33,010 
 Labor (hrs) 4,468 2,398 500 36,756 
 Land (ha) 84 84 4 1,119 
a Based on 2845 farms and 12458 observations in 1995-2004 
b Based on 696 farms and 3223 observations in 1995-2004 
c Based on 597 farms and 3341 observations in 1995-2004 
 
Empirical Results 
Technical Efficiency Differentials 
As a standard empirical application of Battese and Coelli (1995) model, we use the 
maximum likelihood method to estimate the model. Parameter estimates of output 
distance function and inefficiency effects model for each country are shown in 
Appendix 2. The scores for TE and TEC are shown in Table 3. Mean TE in the period 
of 1995-2004 is 61% in Germany, 55% in the Netherlands, and 79% in Sweden. The 
annual scores show an increasing trend for the Netherlands, while average TE is 
decreased in Sweden. These trends are also indicated by the average TEC results 
(positive for the Netherlands and negative for Sweden). German dairy farms exhibit an 
increasing TE in 1995-2000, then a decreasing in 2000-2001, thereafter stabilized in 
2001-2003 and a decrease in 2003-2004. The average TEC in 1995-2004 in German 
dairy farm is very small. 
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Table 3 Technical efficiency (TE) and technical efficiency change (TEC) of dairy farms 
 Germany Netherlands Sweden 
Year TE TEC TE TEC TE TEC 
       
1995 0.583 - 0.472 - 0.827 - 
1996 0.575 -0.008 0.472 0.013 0.838 -0.011 
1997 0.601 0.041 0.510 0.058 0.798 -0.056 
1998 0.608 0.010 0.534 0.048 0.800 -0.001 
1999 0.636 0.022 0.578 0.080 0.771 -0.029 
2000 0.654 0.017 0.557 -0.042 0.792 0.022 
2001 0.619 -0.030 0.590 0.062 0.767 -0.032 
2002 0.621 0.015 0.597 0.007 0.764 0.002 
2003 0.622 -0.005 0.627 0.042 0.782 0.032 
2004 0.612 -0.009 0.614 -0.008 0.759 -0.036 
Average 0.614 0.004 0.553 0.027 0.788 -0.011 
 
 The estimates of technical inefficiency effects model (see Appendix 2) show that 
both the output-related and the input-related subsidies have negative impacts on TE in 
Germany and the Netherlands, but no significant impact in Sweden. The marginal 
effects of exogenous variables on TE (Table 4) show that an increase of one percent 
point in the share of livestock subsidies in total subsidies causes 0.07% and 0.04% 
decreases in TE, while an increase of one percent point in the share of input-related 
subsidies in total subsidies leads to 0.06% and 0.02% decreases in TE for Germany and 
the Netherlands, respectively. These results suggest that a higher degree of coupling in 
the farm support negatively affects farm efficiency. Marginal effects of the share of total 
subsides in total farm income are significantly negative in each of the three countries. 
An increase of one percent point in the share of total subsidies in total farm income 
leads to a 1.12%, 0.87% and 0.89% decrease in TE in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden, respectively. These findings show that the motivation of farmers to work 
efficiently is lower when they depend to a higher degree on subsidies as a source of 
income. This suggests that the wealth and insurance effect of subsidies tends to make 
farmers less efficient. These results for the effects of subsidies on technical efficiency 
are in line with those of Iraizoz et al. (2005) for Spanish beef production, Kleinhanß et 
al. (2007) for German and Spanish livestock farms, and Zhu and Oude Lansink (2010) 
for German, Dutch and Swedish crop farms. According to these findings, it is 
questionable whether farm income support of CAP since the 1992 reform is suitable to 
achieve its goal to increase farmers’ competitiveness by improving their efficiency. 
Additionally, our findings (Table 4) imply that the composition of subsidies (i.e. the 
share of coupled subsidies in total subsidies) has a much smaller effect on efficiency 
than does the composition of total farm income (i.e. the share of total subsidies in total 
income). This result is especially of importance in the light of the 2003 CAP reform, 
which decoupled farm income support from production such that the future CAP 
payments were supposed to not influence production decisions. However, those 
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decoupled payments have a wealth and insurance effect on production (Sckokai and 
Moro, 2006), which may also impact technical efficiency. In a recent study, for 
example, Serra et al. (2008) has shown that increasing decoupled payments led to lower 
TE for Kansas farmers. Future research is certainly warranted on the impact of 
decoupled CAP payments on efficiency after the 2003 CAP reform.  
 
Table 4 Marginal effects of exogenous variables on TE 
 Germany Netherlands Sweden 
Livestock subsidies -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0000 
Input-related subsidies -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0000 
Total subsidies -0.0112 -0.0087 -0.0089 
Farm size 0.0025 0.0016 0.0014 
Degree of specialization  0.0040 0.0046 0.0014 
Family labor  -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0003 
Rented land 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0004 
Long-term debt -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 
Short-term debt -0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0002 
Time trend -0.0012 0.0181 -0.0016 
 
Table 4 also shows that marginal effects of the other exogenous variables have a 
similar pattern for German and Swedish dairy farms. In German and Swedish farms, 
larger size, higher degree of specialization, lower share of family labor, more rented 
land, and lower degree of indebtedness increased efficiency. However, different results 
are obtained with respect to three exogenous factors (i.e. the share of family labor, the 
share of rented land and the share of long-term debts) for Dutch dairy farms. First, a 
higher share of family labor is found to increase TE in the Netherlands. This finding is 
in line with that of Hallam and Machado (1996) for Portuguese dairy farms, who found 
that farms relying on family labor were more efficient than those relying on hired labor. 
Second, a higher share of rented land in total land, which is a proxy for ownership, 
decreases TE. This effect may imply negative influence of agency costs between land 
owners and farmers in the Netherlands (Giannakas et al., 2001, Karagiannis et al., 
2003). Third, a higher share of long-term debts in total assets increases TE for Dutch 
farms. The positive effect may be caused by investments into more efficient assets 
(Barnes, 2008) or may be attributed to the disciplinary role of debts (Zhengfei and Oude 
Lansink, 2006). Furthermore, technical efficiency is decreased over time exogenously 
(i.e. time trend has negative impact on TE) in Sweden and Germany. In Sweden, this 
may be attributed to the accession to the EU which entailed the introduction of dairy 
quota. In Germany, this may be a result of the unification which has initially caused a 
deterioration of the performance of particularly the eastern German farms. 
Technical efficiency changes differently over time in the three countries. The mean 
annual TEC (Table 3) between 1995 and 2004 is 0.4%, 2.7% and -1.1% respectively for 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. That is, technical efficiency of dairy farms in 
Germany and the Netherlands on average improves, whereas it decreases in Sweden. 
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The contributions of the specified exogenous variables and the other unspecified factors 
to technical efficiency change are presented in Table 5. In general, it can be concluded 
that changes in TE over the period 1995-2004 are largely explained by the variables 
specified in the inefficiency model for each country. Unspecified factors only slightly 
contribute to TEC in the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
Table 5 Contributions of specified variables and unspecified factors to TEC 
 Germany  Netherlands Sweden 
    
Livestock subsidies -0.004 -0.005 0 
Input-related subsidies 0.001 0 0 
Total subsidies -0.008 -0.007 -0.011 
Farm size 0.014 0.005 0.006 
Degree of specialization  0.003 0.004 -0.005 
Family labor  0 0 0 
Rented land 0 0 0 
Long-term debt 0 -0.001 0 
Short-term debt 0 0 0 
Time trend -0.002 0.035 -0.004 
Total specified variables 0.004 0.032 -0.014 
Unspecified factors  0 -0.005 0.003 
TEC 0.004 0.027 -0.011 
 
Examining the contribution of the subsidy-related variables to TEC gives a more 
complete overview on the influence of CAP subsidies on the farmers’ performance 
between 1995 and 2004. First, both the volume and the share of the output-related 
livestock subsidies have increased remarkably in each country (Table 1A of Appendix 
1). Therefore, the increase in livestock subsidies causes a negative change in TE in 
Germany and the Netherlands, where these subsidies have significantly negative 
marginal impact on efficiency. Second, the volume of the input-related subsidies and its 
share in total subsidies are growing throughout the period in each country, except for 
2004. There is, on average, a minor positive effect of this share on TEC in Germany, 
but no change in the Netherlands. In Sweden, the marginal effect of the share of input-
related subsidies in total subsidies is not significant; therefore, the changes in those 
payments over the studied period do not affect the farmers’ performance significantly. 
Third, the amount of total subsidies as well as their share in total farm income is 
increasing in each country. Given its significantly negative marginal impact on TE, this 
higher reliance on CAP payments has a negative contribution to the technical efficiency 
change in the countries. In short, what we can see is that in the three studied EU 
countries the farmers’ total income becomes more dependent on subsidies under the 
CAP reform in the period 1995-2004. These changes in farm support, however, have 
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significantly worsened the farmers’ performance, thereby further reinforcing the doubt 
on the suitability of CAP payments for improving overall competitiveness. 
Regarding the effects of the other specified variables on TEC over time, similar 
results for farm size is found. That is, an increase in the mean farm size improves the 
performance (i.e. increased TEC) as its marginal effect is positive for each country. The 
impact of changes in the degree of specialization is positive in Germany and the 
Netherlands, where farmers become more specialized in dairy production between 1995 
and 2004. In Sweden, however, the trend in specialization is the opposite, which 
worsens the efficiency of the Swedish farmers over time. Furthermore, in the 
Netherlands, the remarkably decreasing share of long-term loans in total assets has a 
negative impact on technical efficiency change. This result may imply the adverse effect 
of lower investments for Dutch farmers, given that the marginal effect of long-term 
loans is significantly positive for the Netherlands. 
 
Relative Productivity 
The TE analyses above are based on single-country models and can only be used for 
measuring the scope for improvement in technical efficiency relative to the best 
performed farm within each country. For cross-country comparison, we use the relative 
productivity. In Table 6 we present the average relative productivity scores. To compute 
the relative productivity scores, we first insert the inputs used in one country in the 
production frontier of each of the three countries. The value obtained in this way is 
divided by the value of the frontier output obtained from the own technology (the 
production frontier). Table 6 reports average values of these ratios for the period 1995-
2004; while more detailed, annual results are presented in Appendix 3. In contrast to the 
TE results, the three countries rank oppositely in terms of the relative productivity. That 
is, on average for a given set of total inputs the Dutch production technology results in 
the highest output, followed by the German and Swedish technologies. More 
specifically, the productivity of German dairy farms would be, on average, 6.1% higher 
if these farms would use the production technology of the Dutch dairy farms. Output of 
German dairy farms, however, would decrease by 11% by adopting the Swedish 
production technology. Regarding the Dutch farms, the output using their own 
technology is on average higher than using the alternative technologies available in the 
other countries (Germany and Sweden). In Sweden, dairy farms are relatively less 
productive than their counterparts in both Germany and the Netherlands. Swedish 
productivity could be improved by 13.3% or 20.4%, when using the German or the 
Dutch production technology, respectively. 
 
Table 6 Mean values of the relative productivity ratios 
 German technology Dutch technology Swedish technology 
German farms 1.000 1.061 0.890 
Dutch farms 0.956 1.000 0.850 
Swedish farms 1.133 1.204 1.000 
 
The findings for productivity differentials are of importance given that productivity, 
together with technical efficiency, is a determinant of overall competitiveness 
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(O'Mahoney and van Ark, 2003, Poppe et al., 2007, Porter, 1990). Therefore, the 
analysis of farm efficiency and the comparison of production technologies across 
countries provide insights to the competitiveness of farms and their potential for 
improving productivity and resource use (Abdulai and Tietje, 2007). In addition to the 
fact that there is an opportunity in each country to improve competitiveness by 
increasing technical efficiency, the relative productivity scores unveil further potential 
for improvement in German and Swedish dairy farms. Relative to Dutch farms, farmers 
operating in those two countries employ a less productive technology, despite the fact 
that mean TE scores are higher in those countries than in the Netherlands. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated technical efficiency and technical efficiency 
change of specialized German, Dutch and Swedish dairy farms between 1995 and 2004. 
We have introduced three subsidy-related variables to reflect the wealth and insurance 
effect and the coupling effect of CAP subsidies. Furthermore, we have compared the 
performance of the dairy farms in the sample across countries by analyzing their relative 
productivity. 
Our results show the greatest average TE for Swedish farms, followed by German 
and Dutch farms. Average TEC results indicate an increasing trend in the Netherlands 
and Germany and decreasing trend in Sweden. In German and Swedish dairy farms, 
larger size, higher degree of specialization, lower share of family labor, more rented 
land, and lower degree of indebtedness increase TE. However, three exogenous factors 
including the share of family labor in total labor, the share of rented land in total land 
and the share of long-term debts in total assets have an opposite effect in the 
Netherlands compared to that in Germany and Sweden. In contrast to the technical 
efficiency results, the three countries rank oppositely in terms of relative productivity. 
That is, on average for a given set of total inputs the Dutch production technology 
results in the highest output, followed by the German and Swedish technologies. 
Relative productivity scores show that German and Swedish dairy farms have potential 
for improvement in productivity, compared to the production technology in the 
Netherlands. 
Regarding the effects of CAP subsidies, various observations can be made. First, 
both output-related and input-related subsidies have negative impacts on TE in 
Germany and the Netherlands, but no significant impacts in Sweden. Second, a higher 
share of total subsides in total farm income has a negative effect on TE in each country. 
Third, in each country the farmers’ total income become more dependent on subsidies; 
these changes in farm support have significantly worsened the farmers’ performance. 
Our results imply that a higher degree of coupling in farm support negatively affects 
farm efficiency. The motivation of farmers to work efficiently is lower when they 
depend to a higher degree on subsidies as a source of income. Moreover, our results 
indicate that the composition of subsidies has a much smaller effect on efficiency than 
does the composition of total farm income. This latter finding is especially of 
importance in the light of the 2003 CAP reform, which has decreased the share of 
coupled subsidies but left the share of subsidies in total income unaffected. In summary, 
farm income support of CAP since the 1992 CAP reform may have decreased farmers’ 
overall competitiveness by decreasing their technical efficiency. 
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Appendix 1 – Data 
 
Table 1A Mean livestock subsidies, input-related subsidies and total subsidies of dairy farms (EUR) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Mean 
             
Germany Livestock subsidies   1,181 2,218 1,270 1,094 902 1,785 2,592 3,363 3,537 7,371 2,662 
 Input-related subsidies 6,923 7,653 8,501 8,791 7,053 7,190 6,910 9,220 10,205 9,952 8,322 
 Total  subsidies   13,695 14,728 14,329 14,249 12,194 13,159 14,211 18,095 19,159 22,504 15,877 
             
Netherlands Livestock subsidies   442 521 995 450 327 990 1,709 2,595 2,741 8,824 1,925 
 Input-related subsidies 1,556 1,650 1,644 2,068 2,286 2,317 2,912 3,381 3,581 3,443 2,461 
 Total  subsidies   3,394 3,130 3,011 2,970 3,191 4,001 6,489 7,752 8,240 13,791 5,520 
             
Sweden Livestock subsidies   0 2,401 7,529 6,515 7,158 2,083 3,006 3,424 3,210 9,594 4,622 
 Input-related subsidies 2,888 5,044 4,620 5,420 5,580 13,830 11,078 11,269 11,122 9,095 8,309 
 Total  subsidies   10,046 10,159 19,742 20,146 21,547 26,753 28,449 29,707 28,204 29,363 23,090 
             
Source: FAD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Table 2A Composition of outputs in each country (%) 
Year Crops & crop products Livestock and Livestock products Other   output Total 
  Milk & products Other  livestock products   
Germany      
1995 7 67 21 5 100 
1996 8 68 19 5 100 
1997 7 69 19 5 100 
1998 7 70 17 6 100 
1999 5 72 18 6 100 
2000 5 75 15 5 100 
2001 5 76 14 5 100 
2002 6 73 15 5 100 
2003 7 73 15 6 100 
2004 6 71 16 6 100 
Average 6 71 17 5 100 
Netherlands      
1995 1 75 21 3 100 
1996 1 76 20 3 100 
1997 1 76 19 3 100 
1998 1 79 16 4 100 
1999 2 79 15 4 100 
2000 1 80 15 4 100 
2001 3 82 11 4 100 
2002 2 82 11 5 100 
2003 2 82 11 5 100 
2004 2 81 12 5 100 
Average 2 79 15 4 100 
Sweden      
1995 4 77 15 4 100 
1996 11 72 11 5 100 
1997 8 77 12 4 100 
1998 7 75 13 5 100 
1999 7 76 11 5 100 
2000 9 74 12 5 100 
2001 9 74 11 6 100 
2002 9 73 11 6 100 
2003 19 65 10 6 100 
2004 19 65 9 7 100 
Average 11 73 11 5 100 
Source: FAD 
ote: crops and crop products include cereals, protein crops, energy crops, potatoes, sugar 
beets, industrial crops, vegetables and flowers, fruit, wine and grapes, olive & olive oil, forage 
area, other crop output. Livestock and livestock products include cows’ milk & products, beef 
and veal, pig meat, sheep and goats, poultry meat, eggs, other livestock & products. Other 
output includes leased land, agistment, forestry products, contract work, hiring out of 
equipment, receipts of tourisms etc. 
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Appendix 2 – Parameter Estimates 
 
Germany 
Number of observations: 12458  
Log likelihood: 7284. Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln ( milk)       
Ln (variable inputs) 0.91585 0.11023 8.31 0 0.69980 1.13190 
Ln (capital) 0.49771 0.08661 5.75 0 0.32795 0.66746 
Ln (labour) 0.41502 0.13208 3.14 0.002 0.15615 0.67390 
Ln (land) 0.56515 0.10648 5.31 0 0.35645 0.77385 
Ln (other products/milk) 0.09494 0.05803 1.64 0.102 -0.01878 0.20867 
Time 0.06415 0.01534 4.18 0 0.03409 0.09421 
Ln (variable inputs)**2 0.01576 0.00819 1.92 0.054 -0.00030 0.03182 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (capital) 0.00385 0.01078 0.36 0.721 -0.01728 0.02498 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (labour) -0.07312 0.01391 -5.26 0 -0.10039 -0.04585 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (land) -0.03464 0.01266 -2.74 0.006 -0.05945 -0.00984 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (other 
products/milk) -0.05750 0.00641 -8.96 0 -0.07007 -0.04493 
Ln (capital)**2 -0.01813 0.00439 -4.13 0 -0.02673 -0.00954 
Ln (capital)* Ln (labour) 0.00164 0.01169 0.14 0.888 -0.02127 0.02455 
Ln (capital)* Ln (land)  -0.01280 0.01089 -1.18 0.24 -0.03415 0.00854 
Ln (capital)* Ln (other products/milk) 0.00778 0.00549 1.42 0.156 -0.00298 0.01853 
Ln (labour)**2 0.00228 0.00904 0.25 0.801 -0.01544 0.02000 
Ln (labour)* Ln (land)  0.01434 0.01381 1.04 0.299 -0.01273 0.04140 
Ln (labour)* Ln (other products/milk) -0.01350 0.00660 -2.05 0.041 -0.02643 -0.00057 
Ln (land)**2 -0.02567 0.00807 -3.18 0.001 -0.04148 -0.00985 
Ln (land )* Ln (other products/milk) 0.02441 0.00595 4.1 0 0.01275 0.03607 
Ln (other products/milk)**2  -0.05114 0.00335 -15.25 0 -0.05771 -0.04456 
Time* Ln (variable inputs) 0.00330 0.00151 2.18 0.029 0.00034 0.00627 
Time* Ln (capital) -0.00624 0.00128 -4.87 0 -0.00875 -0.00373 
Time* Ln (labour) -0.00130 0.00159 -0.82 0.413 -0.00443 0.00182 
Time*Ln (land) -0.00678 0.00137 -4.93 0 -0.00947 -0.00408 
Time* Ln (other products/milk) -0.00042 0.00074 -0.57 0.57 -0.00188 0.00103 
Time_square 0.00105 0.00024 4.3 0 0.00057 0.00152 
Constant -3.35796 0.59043 -5.69 0 -4.51517 -2.20074 
u       
Share of livestock subsidies 0.00124 0.00009 13.92 0 0.00106 0.00141 
Share of input-related subsidies 0.00103 0.00006 16.1 0 0.00090 0.00116 
Share total subsidies in total income 0.01945 0.00029 67.5 0 0.01888 0.02001 
Farm size -0.00431 0.00012 -35.65 0 -0.00455 -0.00408 
Specialization degree -0.00694 0.00066 -10.55 0 -0.00823 -0.00565 
Family labour 0.00075 0.00011 6.85 0 0.00053 0.00096 
Rented land -0.00041 0.00006 -7.24 0 -0.00053 -0.00030 
Long-term debt 0.00013 0.00009 1.43 0.152 -0.00005 0.00030 
Short-term debt 0.00043 0.00012 3.67 0 0.00020 0.00066 
time 0.00205 0.00422 0.49 0.628 -0.00622 0.01031 
Niedersachsen 0.06634 0.00497 13.36 0 0.05661 0.07607 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.01916 0.00574 3.34 0.001 0.00791 0.03040 
Hessen 0.07805 0.00611 12.77 0 0.06608 0.09003 
Rheinland-Pfalz 0.02109 0.00642 3.28 0.001 0.00850 0.03368 
Baden-Württemberg 0.00809 0.00659 1.23 0.219 -0.00482 0.02101 
Bayern -0.03754 0.00604 -6.21 0 -0.04938 -0.02569 
Saarland 0.01827 0.01188 1.54 0.124 -0.00501 0.04155 
Brandenburg 0.04153 0.01464 2.84 0.005 0.01284 0.07022 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 0.01218 0.01240 0.98 0.326 -0.01211 0.03648 
Sachsen 0.06540 0.00797 8.21 0 0.04978 0.08102 
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.02387 0.01344 1.78 0.076 -0.00248 0.05022 
Thüringen 0.02563 0.01126 2.28 0.023 0.00355 0.04771 
Constant  0.91289 0.07098 12.86 0 0.77378 1.05200 
σ
2
 0.0191 0.0003   0.0186 0.0196 
γ 0.5661 0.0581   0.4507 0.6747 
σu
2
 0.0108 0.0011   0.0086 0.0130 
σv
2
 0.0083 0.0011   0.0061 0.0104 
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9etherlands 
Number of observations: 3223   
Log likelihood: 2155 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln ( milk)       
Ln (variable inputs) 1.71782 0.19013 9.04 0 1.34518 2.09046 
Ln (capital) 0.66615 0.16720 3.98 0 0.33844 0.99386 
Ln (labour) 0.64838 0.24675 2.63 0.009 0.16476 1.13200 
Ln (land) 0.38907 0.18714 2.08 0.038 0.02228 0.75585 
Ln (other products/milk) -0.33126 0.07921 -4.18 0 -0.48652 -0.17601 
Time -0.03057 0.02540 -1.2 0.229 -0.08036 0.01921 
Ln (variable inputs)**2 0.02925 0.01762 1.66 0.097 -0.00528 0.06378 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (capital) -0.06263 0.02549 -2.46 0.014 -0.11259 -0.01267 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (labour) -0.07669 0.02998 -2.56 0.011 -0.13545 -0.01793 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (land) -0.14692 0.02305 -6.37 0 -0.19211 -0.10174 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (other 
products/milk) -0.00150 0.01053 -0.14 0.887 -0.02214 0.01915 
Ln (capital)**2 -0.00911 0.01233 -0.74 0.46 -0.03329 0.01506 
Ln (capital)* Ln (labour) -0.01406 0.02545 -0.55 0.581 -0.06394 0.03581 
Ln (capital)* Ln (land)  0.04731 0.02229 2.12 0.034 0.00363 0.09099 
Ln (capital)* Ln (other products/milk) -0.00865 0.00986 -0.88 0.38 -0.02797 0.01066 
Ln (labour)**2 -0.01521 0.01817 -0.84 0.403 -0.05082 0.02041 
Ln (labour)* Ln (land)  0.09495 0.02679 3.54 0 0.04245 0.14746 
Ln (labour)* Ln (other products/milk) 0.02387 0.01178 2.03 0.043 0.00078 0.04696 
Ln (land)**2 -0.07426 0.01428 -5.2 0 -0.10225 -0.04628 
Ln (land )* Ln (other products/milk) 0.00336 0.00962 0.35 0.727 -0.01550 0.02221 
Ln (other products/milk)**2  -0.03920 0.00419 -9.35 0 -0.04742 -0.03099 
Time* Ln (variable inputs) 0.00278 0.00300 0.92 0.355 -0.00311 0.00866 
Time* Ln (capital) -0.00002 0.00286 -0.01 0.995 -0.00562 0.00558 
Time* Ln (labour) -0.00277 0.00333 -0.83 0.406 -0.00931 0.00376 
Time*Ln (land) 0.00811 0.00266 3.05 0.002 0.00289 0.01332 
Time* Ln (other products/milk) 0.00225 0.00119 1.88 0.06 -0.00009 0.00459 
Time_square 0.00121 0.00037 3.27 0.001 0.00048 0.00194 
Constant -6.78290 1.02622 -6.61 0 -8.79425 -4.77156 
u       
Share of livestock subsidies 0.00073 0.00010 7.57 0 0.00054 0.00091 
Share of input-related subsidies 0.00034 0.00009 3.87 0 0.00017 0.00051 
Share total subsidies in total income 0.01643 0.00100 16.51 0 0.01448 0.01838 
Farm size -0.00307 0.00012 
-
26.34 0 -0.00330 -0.00284 
Specialization degree -0.00877 0.00071 
-
12.41 0 -0.01016 -0.00739 
Family labour -0.00048 0.00023 -2.05 0.04 -0.00093 -0.00002 
Rented land 0.00026 0.00008 3.23 0.001 0.00010 0.00042 
Long-term debt -0.00060 0.00014 -4.28 0 -0.00087 -0.00032 
Short-term debt 0.00334 0.00066 5.07 0 0.00205 0.00463 
time -0.03419 0.00697 -4.9 0 -0.04786 -0.02053 
Constant  1.85499 0.09091 20.4 0 1.67681 2.03317 
σ
2
 0.0158 0.0004   0.0151 0.0166 
γ 0.4307 0.1482   0.1880 0.7120 
σu
2
 0.0068 0.0024   0.0022 0.0115 
σv
2
 0.0090 0.0023   0.0045 0.0136 
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Sweden 
Number of observations: 3341 
  
Log likelihood: 1291 Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln ( milk)       
Ln (variable inputs) 0.63462 0.18297 3.47 0.001 0.27601 0.99324 
Ln (capital) -0.27054 0.15872 -1.7 0.088 -0.58162 0.04053 
Ln (labour) 0.78805 0.21295 3.7 0 0.37067 1.20544 
Ln (land) 0.21124 0.14031 1.51 0.132 -0.06376 0.48623 
Ln (other products/milk) -0.38599 0.09675 -3.99 0 -0.57561 -0.19636 
Time 0.05461 0.02877 1.9 0.058 -0.00177 0.11099 
Ln (variable inputs)**2 0.02639 0.01725 1.53 0.126 -0.00742 0.06021 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (capital) -0.07605 0.02344 -3.24 0.001 -0.12199 -0.03010 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (labour) 0.05984 0.02760 2.17 0.03 0.00574 0.11394 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (land) -0.02760 0.01778 -1.55 0.121 -0.06244 0.00725 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (other 
products/milk) -0.00981 0.01201 -0.82 0.414 -0.03334 0.01372 
Ln (capital)**2 0.08031 0.01371 5.86 0 0.05343 0.10718 
Ln (capital)* Ln (labour) -0.03521 0.02359 -1.49 0.136 -0.08144 0.01102 
Ln (capital)* Ln (land)  -0.03532 0.01701 -2.08 0.038 -0.06865 -0.00198 
Ln (capital)* Ln (other products/milk) -0.01478 0.00984 -1.5 0.133 -0.03406 0.00450 
Ln (labour)**2 -0.06228 0.01621 -3.84 0 -0.09406 -0.03051 
Ln (labour)* Ln (land)  0.07617 0.02178 3.5 0 0.03348 0.11886 
Ln (labour)* Ln (other products/milk) 0.01273 0.01408 0.9 0.366 -0.01487 0.04033 
Ln (land)**2 -0.03720 0.00731 -5.09 0 -0.05153 -0.02287 
Ln (land )* Ln (other products/milk) 0.03012 0.00821 3.67 0 0.01402 0.04621 
Ln (other products/milk)**2  -0.06580 0.00300 
-
21.94 0 -0.07168 -0.05992 
Time* Ln (variable inputs) -0.01408 0.00405 -3.48 0.001 -0.02201 -0.00615 
Time* Ln (capital) 0.00890 0.00293 3.03 0.002 0.00314 0.01465 
Time* Ln (labour) -0.00922 0.00386 -2.39 0.017 -0.01678 -0.00166 
Time*Ln (land) 0.01222 0.00296 4.14 0 0.00643 0.01801 
Time* Ln (other products/milk) -0.00747 0.00182 -4.11 0 -0.01103 -0.00391 
Time_square 0.00082 0.00052 1.58 0.114 -0.00020 0.00184 
Constant -1.91418 0.85869 -2.23 0.026 -3.59717 -0.23118 
u       
Share of livestock subsidies 0.00003 0.00029 0.09 0.931 -0.00054 0.00059 
Share of input-related subsidies 0.00004 0.00027 0.13 0.894 -0.00049 0.00057 
Share total subsidies in total income 0.02063 0.00081 25.37 0 0.01904 0.02223 
Farm size -0.00319 0.00044 -7.3 0 -0.00405 -0.00233 
Specialization degree -0.00332 0.00105 -3.17 0.002 -0.00537 -0.00127 
Family labour 0.00069 0.00054 1.29 0.196 -0.00036 0.00174 
Rented land -0.00086 0.00017 -5 0 -0.00120 -0.00052 
Long-term debt 0.00032 0.00031 1.04 0.298 -0.00029 0.00094 
Short-term debt 0.00057 0.00068 0.83 0.408 -0.00078 0.00191 
time 0.00365 0.00499 0.73 0.464 -0.00612 0.01342 
Slattbygdslan 0.14260 0.01920 7.43 0 0.10496 0.18024 
Skogs-och mellanbbygdslan 0.07563 0.01768 4.28 0 0.04098 0.11027 
Constant  0.14097 0.10600 1.33 0.184 -0.06680 0.34873 
σ
2
 0.0410 0.0020   0.0373 0.0451 
γ 0.7048 0.0255   0.6525 0.7522 
σu
2
 0.0289 0.0022   0.0246 0.0331 
σv
2
 0.0121 0.0009   0.0104 0.0138 
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Appendix 3 – Estimation of relative productivity 
 
Germany 
 German technology Dutch technology Swedish technology 
Predicted output (logarithm) 
1995 7.082 7.306 6.189 
1996 7.062 7.309 6.212 
1997 7.004 7.278 6.158 
1998 6.896 7.394 6.190 
1999 6.814 7.429 6.188 
2000 6.868 7.428 6.256 
2001 6.802 7.437 6.245 
2002 6.739 7.500 6.297 
2003 6.757 7.562 6.363 
2004 6.679 7.574 6.342 
Average 6.860 7.414 6.241 
Ratios of predicted output using other technology to predicted output using own technology 
1995 1.000 1.018 0.859 
1996 1.000 1.020 0.864 
1997 1.000 1.026 0.864 
1998 1.000 1.061 0.884 
1999 1.000 1.074 0.890 
2000 1.000 1.066 0.893 
2001 1.000 1.077 0.900 
2002 1.000 1.091 0.912 
2003 1.000 1.099 0.921 
2004 1.000 1.111 0.927 
Average 1.000 1.061 0.890 
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9etherlands 
 German technology Dutch technology Swedish technology 
Predicted output (logarithm) 
1995 7.334 7.416 6.373 
1996 7.285 7.336 6.274 
1997 7.238 7.324 6.252 
1998 7.097 7.53 6.342 
1999 7.097 7.495 6.329 
2000 7.073 7.405 6.281 
2001 7.082 7.487 6.372 
2002 7.039 7.613 6.428 
2003 7.057 7.601 6.483 
2004 7.011 7.575 6.482 
Average 7.135 7.471 6.357 
Ratios of predicted output using other technology to predicted output using own technology 
1995 0.990 1.000 0.858 
1996 0.994 1.000 0.854 
1997 0.989 1.000 0.852 
1998 0.943 1.000 0.841 
1999 0.947 1.000 0.843 
2000 0.956 1.000 0.847 
2001 0.947 1.000 0.851 
2002 0.926 1.000 0.844 
2003 0.930 1.000 0.853 
2004 0.927 1.000 0.856 
Average 0.956 1.000 0.850 
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Sweden 
 German technology Dutch technology Swedish technology 
Predicted output (logarithm) 
1995 6.989 6.915 5.701 
1996 7.100 7.205 6.088 
1997 7.090 7.165 6.066 
1998 7.009 7.215 6.096 
1999 6.965 7.248 6.137 
2000 6.923 7.346 6.207 
2001 6.875 7.318 6.187 
2002 6.770 7.398 6.165 
2003 6.727 7.673 6.258 
2004 6.680 7.665 6.231 
Average 6.907 7.333 6.132 
Ratios of predicted output using other technology to predicted output using own technology 
1995 1.231 1.218 1.000 
1996 1.172 1.191 1.000 
1997 1.174 1.187 1.000 
1998 1.155 1.19 1.000 
1999 1.142 1.188 1.000 
2000 1.121 1.192 1.000 
2001 1.117 1.191 1.000 
2002 1.104 1.21 1.000 
2003 1.081 1.236 1.000 
2004 1.079 1.244 1.000 
Average 1.133 1.204 1.000 
 
 
